In short
- The current FDA guidance is “Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions,” issued February 2026, which supersedes the June 2025 edition and, before it, the September 2023 final guidance.
- Under section 524B of the FD&C Act, in effect since March 29, 2023, submissions for cyber devices must include a postmarket vulnerability plan, processes that provide reasonable assurance of cybersecurity, and an SBOM.
- FDA also recommends a threat model, security risk assessment, four security architecture views, vulnerability and penetration testing, and security labeling, scaled to the device's cybersecurity risk.
The current FDA guidance is “Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions,” issued in February 2026 (the document is dated February 3, 2026). It supersedes the June 27, 2025 edition, which itself superseded the first final version of September 27, 2023. For a software as a medical device (SaMD) team, it means a premarket submission should carry a security risk management report with a threat model, a machine-readable software bill of materials (SBOM), security architecture views, cybersecurity test reports including penetration testing, security labeling and a plan for handling vulnerabilities after launch. If the device meets the legal definition of a cyber device, the statute makes several of those items mandatory.
How has the FDA premarket cybersecurity guidance changed since 2023?
- September 27, 2023: FDA finalized “Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions.” It replaced the 2014 guidance on premarket cybersecurity content.
- March 13, 2024: FDA issued a draft, “Select Updates for the Premarket Cybersecurity Guidance: Section 524B of the FD&C Act,” proposing updated recommendations for cyber devices.
- June 27, 2025: a new final edition added Section VII on section 524B and cyber devices, superseding the 2023 version.
- February 2026: the current edition renamed “Quality System” to “Quality Management System” and aligned the text with FDA's Quality Management System Regulation (QMSR), which took effect on February 2, 2026 and incorporates ISO 13485:2016 by reference.
In FDA's own summary of the history, the June 2025 edition added the cyber device section, and the February 2026 edition revised the text to align with the QMSR amendments to 21 CFR Part 820, so references to the old Quality System Regulation now point to ISO 13485 clauses. If your team prepared a package against the 2023 text, the core recommendations below will look familiar. The docket number for comments is FDA-2021-D-1158.
What is a cyber device under section 524B?
Section 3305 of the Food and Drug Omnibus Reform Act (FDORA), enacted December 29, 2022, added section 524B to the FD&C Act. From March 29, 2023, anyone submitting a 510(k), PMA, PDP, De Novo or HDE for a cyber device must include information showing the device meets the cybersecurity requirements of section 524B(b). A cyber device is one that includes software validated, installed or authorized by the sponsor, has the ability to connect to the internet, and contains technological characteristics that could be vulnerable to cybersecurity threats.
FDA reads “ability to connect to the internet” broadly, intentionally or not, at any point in the device's threat surface. Its illustrative list includes network, server or cloud connections; radio-frequency links such as Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth and Bluetooth Low Energy; magnetic inductive communication; and hardware connectors such as USB, Ethernet and serial ports. The guidance gives the example of a device serviced over USB: the connection may be brief, but the ability to connect is there. By that list, SaMD that connects to a cloud backend will usually meet the definition.
Section 524B(b) then requires three things. First, a plan to monitor, identify and address postmarket vulnerabilities and exploits in a reasonable time, including coordinated vulnerability disclosure. Second, processes and procedures that provide reasonable assurance the device and related systems are cybersecure, including updates and patches on a reasonably justified regular cycle for known unacceptable vulnerabilities and, as soon as possible out of cycle, for critical vulnerabilities that could cause uncontrolled risks. Third, an SBOM that includes commercial, open-source and off-the-shelf components. Failing to comply with section 524B(b)(2) is a prohibited act under section 301(q) of the FD&C Act.
Does the guidance apply if my device is not a cyber device?
Yes. The guidance applies to devices with cybersecurity considerations, including any device that contains software, firmware or programmable logic, whether or not it is network-enabled. It covers 510(k), De Novo, PMA, PDP, IDE, HDE, BLA and IND submissions, and its recommendations also apply to devices that do not need a premarket submission, such as 510(k)-exempt devices. The cyber device section adds statutory requirements on top.
Documentation is meant to scale with cybersecurity risk, not with the software documentation level from FDA's separate software guidance. A device with high software risk can have small cybersecurity risk because of how it is designed, and the reverse is also possible. FDA's example is a simple non-connected thermometer, which may need only a limited security architecture, compared with the same thermometer in a safety-critical control loop or on a network.
What security objectives and frameworks does FDA expect?
FDA assesses device cybersecurity against five security objectives across the architecture: authenticity (which includes integrity), authorization, availability, confidentiality, and secure and timely updatability and patchability. The guidance says these apply broadly, including to devices with AI and cloud-based services.
FDA recommends a secure product development framework (SPDF), a set of processes that reduces the number and severity of vulnerabilities across design, development, release, support and decommissioning. It is one of several ways to meet the QMSR. FDA names the Medical Device and Health IT Joint Security Plan (JSP2), IEC 81001-5-1 and ANSI/ISA 62443-4-1 as frameworks to consider.
What goes into the security risk management report?
FDA treats security risk management as distinct from safety risk management under ISO 14971 and recommends doing both. Security risk assessment focuses on exploitability rather than probability, because the likelihood of an attack cannot be predicted from historical failure data. FDA recommends a security risk management plan and report such as those described in AAMI TIR57 and ANSI/AAMI SW96. The report should include:
- A threat model covering the whole medical device system, with stated assumptions. FDA's example assumption is that hospital networks are hostile, so manufacturers should assume an adversary controls the network and can alter, drop and replay packets.
- A cybersecurity risk assessment with pre- and post-mitigation scoring, acceptance criteria and the method for transferring security risks into the safety risk process.
- The SBOM, component support information and an assessment of every known vulnerability, including those in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, which FDA says should be designed out of the device.
- A security assessment of unresolved software anomalies, including any Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories present.
- Traceability between the threat model, risk assessment, SBOM and testing.
FDA also recommends tracking process metrics and reporting them when available: the share of identified vulnerabilities that are updated or patched, the time from identification to patch, and the time from a patch being available to it being deployed in the field.
What does FDA want in the SBOM?
The SBOM should be machine-readable and include the minimum elements from the October 2021 NTIA document “Framing Software Component Transparency.” It should list your own components, third-party commercial and open-source components, and their upstream dependencies. On top of the NTIA elements, FDA asks for two fields per component: the level of support from the component's maker (for example actively maintained, no longer maintained or abandoned) and the component's end-of-support date. These can sit in the SBOM or in an addendum. For each known vulnerability, the submission should say how it was found, give a safety and security risk assessment and describe the controls that address it.
FDA expects the SBOM to be maintained under configuration management, updated as the software changes, and made available to users on a continuous basis as part of labeling.
What are the four security architecture views?
FDA recommends that submissions include, at minimum, four types of views, each with diagrams and explanatory text:
- Global system view: the whole system and every internal and external connection, including update infrastructure, hospital network, cloud connections and patient home networks.
- Multi-patient harm view: how the system defends against or responds to attacks that could harm many patients at once, such as every bedside monitor on one network restarting together.
- Updatability and patchability view: the end-to-end path by which updates reach the device, including parts the manufacturer does not control.
- Security use case views: every function where a compromise could affect safety or effectiveness, across operational states such as power on, standby and transitions, and clinical states such as alarming, delivering therapy or reporting results.
Security controls should cover eight categories: authentication, authorization, cryptography, code, data and execution integrity, confidentiality, event detection and logging, resiliency and recovery, and updatability and patchability. FDA asks for evidence that the controls were implemented and tested.
What cybersecurity testing does FDA expect?
- Security requirements testing: evidence that each security design input was implemented, plus boundary analysis with the rationale for boundary assumptions.
- Threat mitigation testing against the threat models in the four architecture views.
- Vulnerability testing: abuse and misuse cases, malformed and unexpected inputs, robustness and fuzz testing, attack surface analysis, vulnerability chaining, closed box scanning for known vulnerabilities, software composition analysis of binaries, and static and dynamic code analysis, including checks for hardcoded, default or easily guessed credentials.
- Penetration testing, with a report that states the testers' independence and expertise, scope, duration, methods and results.
Reports should say who did the testing and how independent they were from the developers. For third-party tests, FDA wants the original report. For every finding, the submission should give your assessment, including the rationale for any fix you defer to a later release and the plan and timeline for that release. After release, FDA recommends testing at regular intervals commensurate with risk, giving annual testing as an example.
What labeling and postmarket plans are needed?
Labeling should give users what they need to run the device securely. FDA's examples include recommended security controls for the environment, a list of network ports and interfaces with their direction and approved endpoints, the SBOM, how users get authorized updates, how the device logs and reports security events, backup and restore, secure configuration, end-of-support information and how to decommission the device safely. A Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security (MDS2) can cover part of this.
The cybersecurity management plan should name the people responsible, the sources and frequency of vulnerability monitoring, how CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog is handled, periodic security testing, the timeline to develop and release patches, the update process and patching capability, the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process and how fixes will be communicated to customers. For cyber devices, this plan is how you meet section 524B(b)(1).
What about changes to a device that is already on the market?
If a modification needs a new 510(k), PMA supplement or other covered submission, section 524B applies to it. FDA separates changes that may affect cybersecurity, such as new authentication or encryption algorithms, new connectivity or a new update mechanism, from changes that are unlikely to, such as materials or an algorithm change that leaves architecture and connectivity alone. For the second group a reduced package is enough: the 524B(b)(1) plan or a reference to it, a statement on any critical vulnerabilities and past remediations, and an SBOM. FDA gives a 510(k) example: a central nursing station alarm that lacks encryption against a recently identified threat could be found not substantially equivalent to its predicate if the sponsor cannot supply adequate data.
Where should a SaMD team start?
- Decide early whether the product is a cyber device. For most connected SaMD, assume it is.
- Start the threat model during design and keep it current; FDA wants it maintained across the product life.
- Generate the SBOM from your build, in a machine-readable format, and add support level and end-of-support dates per component.
- Draw the four architecture views while the architecture is still cheap to change.
- Plan independent penetration testing before submission and keep the original reports.
- Use FDA's Q-Submission program to discuss your cybersecurity approach before you submit; the guidance encourages it.
We build medical device software under an IEC 62304 process, produce the software documentation an FDA submission needs, and run penetration tests before launch. The submission itself and the decision on it belong to the manufacturer and FDA. Onix Systems has built software since 2000 and has 370+ engineers.
If you want to know how far your current codebase is from this documentation set, talk to one of our engineers. Our 5-day free technical audit ends with a written report covering your threat model, SBOM and testing gaps.
Sources
- FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions (guidance page)
- FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, final guidance PDF (February 3, 2026)
- FDA: Cybersecurity (Digital Health Center of Excellence), guidance history
- FDA: Content of Premarket Submissions for Device Software Functions (June 2023)